

# Accepting immigrants as fellow citizens: citizenship representations in relation to migration policy preferences

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Citizenship representations within national populations have mainly been deduced from state policies on migration. Yet, at the individual level, no studies have investigated whether citizenship representations are reliably associated with preferences for specific migration policies (i.e. the underlying assumption for deducing citizenship representations from state policies). Because several studies have shown that state policies may not reflect understandings of citizenship within national populations, it may be more relevant to study citizenship representations at the individual level, in relation to personal preferences regarding migration policies. This study examined how ethnic, cultural and civic citizenship representations relate to migration policy preferences at the individual level among majority group high-school students ( $N = 1,734$ ) in seven EU countries. Findings add to the understanding of citizenship representations and may have implications for the implementation of migration policies.

**Keywords:** citizenship representations; ethnic; civic; cultural; migration policy; integration

## Introduction

Several authors have pointed out an important limitation in the citizenship literature, namely that citizenship representations, supposedly endorsed by national populations, have mainly been deduced from state policy regimes (i.e. policies and legislation on migration), while public opinion studies have been largely absent (e.g. Shulman 2002; Björklund 2006; Ariely 2011b). The assumption has been that policy models and dominant citizenship discourses at the state level reflect how ordinary citizens think about citizenship. However, the degree to which discourses among state actors are popularly supported within general populations tends to be overestimated (Lamont 2000; Hjerm and Schnabel 2010). In line with this, several studies showed disparities between national migration policies and public opinion regarding these policies (e.g. Joppke 2004; Maisonneuve and Testé 2007). In part, such disparities may exist because people are unaware of their country's policies. In addition, some authors claim that state policies tend to reflect the concerns of the political elite rather than those of the general population (Shulman 2002). For example, when developing migration policies, economic and social concerns may also be taken into account, apart from concerns regarding migration itself. Helbling (2012), however, goes as far as to conclude that policy models cannot be observed as broader social phenomena beyond formal and legal

regulations. He found that not even the positions and arguments used by political actors in public debates were in line with state policies. In Europe, which is the focus of this study, policies may also be converging due to European integration, which makes them even less likely to reflect popular notions of migration and citizenship (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). Finally, people's ideas about citizenship are subjective, so they may entertain a variety of approaches to citizenship. Hence, the official citizenship criteria applied at the state level are not necessarily the same as those applied by members of the general population at the individual level (Rothì, Lyons, and Chrysochoou 2005).

Although state policy regimes on migration are unlikely to reflect how citizenship is understood within national populations, we do expect people's citizenship representations to relate meaningfully to the preferences they have regarding migration policies. Several studies have shown that it tends to be people's perceptions and preferences rather than objective contextual factors that influence attitudes and behaviour. For example, Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) found that perceived rather than actual out-group size increases perceptions of ethnic threat. Sides and Citrin (2007) and Citrin and Sides (2008) observed that subjective individual-level factors like social trust and preferences for cultural homogeneity were more important determinants of immigration attitudes than objective country-level factors like gross domestic product and unemployment rate.

In light of these results and the disparities between state policies and public opinion, it seems more relevant to study citizenship representations at the individual level, in relation to personal preferences regarding migration policies, than at the national level, in relation to state policies. That was the aim of the present study. Specifically, we explored whether ethnic, cultural and civic citizenship representations are reliably associated with preferences regarding immigration, integration and citizenship policies. We did so among majority group high-school students in academic tracks in seven European Union (EU) countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. We focused on the EU because it is an important destination for migrants. As a result, EU countries have become increasingly culturally and ethnically diverse over the past decades (Castles and Miller 2009). In addition, partly due to immigration and European integration, EU countries have a relatively high level of globalization, which affects inter-group relations and citizenship representations (Ariely 2011a, 2012b). At the same time, there is enough variety in migration histories to make the EU interesting for cross-national comparative research. High-school samples were chosen to facilitate cross-national comparisons (see Method section).

Given that citizenship representations are traditionally deduced from state policies regarding migration, it is striking that, as far as we know, no studies have investigated whether individual differences in citizenship representations are reliably associated with individual differences in migration policy preferences. This makes the present study particularly relevant. Examining citizenship representations in relation to migration policy preferences is also relevant for the study of inter-group relations, because policy preferences have concrete practical implications for the treatment of newcomers as well as immigrants who are already present in society. Supporting specific migration policies has more tangible consequences than merely having positive or negative attitudes or prejudice towards immigrants (e.g. Vanbeselaere, Boen, and Meeus 2006; Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009; Meeus et al. 2010). After all,

people can vote for political parties that promise to implement the migration policies that they prefer. Finally, knowledge about the preferred migration policies associated with different citizenship representations may offer a deeper understanding of public support for approaches to migration and citizenship implemented by national governments.

### *Citizenship representations*

In much of the political science literature, citizenship representations are understood as stable socio-historical characteristics of nation states that are expressed through national policies and legislation (Kohn 1944). However, when studying citizenship representations at the individual level, they can be understood from the perspective of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner 1986) and self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al. 1987) as subjective definitions of the national in-group prototype (Reijerse et al. 2013). In-group prototypes are shaped through processes of self-stereotyping after a social group is formed. They are a representation of the group and its members in terms of norms, values and characteristics. The prototypical characteristics that group members are desired to have may be used as membership criteria. In the case of national groups, these membership criteria are embedded in citizenship representations and used to determine whether someone can be regarded a fellow citizen or not.

The citizenship literature identifies ethnic, cultural and civic conceptualizations of citizenship (Kohn 1944; Brubaker 1990; Smith 1991; Nielsen 1999; Kymlicka 2001). At the individual level, national majority group members may manifest citizenship representations that correspond to these theoretical conceptualizations. When citizenship is ethnically represented, the national in-group is defined as a community of people of common descent. Only people with an ancestry in the ethnic majority group are recognized as citizens. Previous studies found that an ethnic citizenship representation relates positively to anti-immigrant attitudes (Weldon 2006; Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka 2009; Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009; Meeus et al. 2010; Wright 2011; Ariely 2012a). When citizenship is culturally represented, the national in-group is defined as a community of people with a common culture. The community's highest priority is ensuring the survival of its culture and people who maintain and protect this culture are recognized as citizens. Although, in theory, a cultural citizenship representation implies openness to immigrants who adopt the national culture (Kymlicka 2001), it has been found to be associated with negative attitudes regarding immigrants in general (Reijerse et al. 2013; see also Ariely 2011b). Because of its emphasis on assimilation, Weldon (2006) hypothesized that a cultural representation would relate to low levels of social tolerance towards immigrants (i.e. tolerance for the expression of cultural difference). However, because immigrants who adopt the national culture would, in theory, be accepted as fellow citizens and receive the same political liberties as members of the national majority group, he also hypothesized that the cultural representation would relate to relatively high levels of political tolerance towards immigrants. Instead, he found that cultural representation was associated with low levels of both social *and* political tolerance. Finally, when citizenship is civically represented, the national in-group is defined as a community of people who adhere to a social contract that contains basic principles that facilitate life

as a community (e.g. adherence to the law and active participation in society). Adhering to this contract suffices to be recognized as a citizen. With some exceptions (e.g. Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009), most studies found that a civic citizenship representation relates negatively to anti-immigrant attitudes (Vanbeselaere, Boen, and Meeus 2006; Weldon 2006; Meeus et al. 2010; Wright 2011; Ariely 2012a).

Whether people manifest a distinct cultural citizenship representation (i.e. that corresponds to the theoretical cultural conceptualization of citizenship and is separate from ethnic and civic representations) is a contested issue. Empirical evidence for a three-factor model of citizenship representations at the individual level (i.e. ethnic, cultural and civic factors) was presented only recently by Reijerse et al. (2013).

### *The present study*

The present study investigated how ethnic, cultural and civic citizenship representations relate to preferences regarding immigration, integration and citizenship policies. Specifically, we considered the restrictiveness of entrance policies, the degree to which the government facilitates immigrants' integration, and the restrictiveness in granting immigrants citizenship. We conducted our study at the individual level among majority group high-school students in academic tracks in seven EU countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Because our study is comparative, we also examined whether the relationships between citizenship representations and policy preferences are cross-nationally invariant.

We take a social identity perspective (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987) and apply theories and models that focus on in-group homogeneity, group distinctiveness and social categorization to predict how citizenship representations relate to policy preferences. SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1986) holds that people are strongly motivated to maintain group distinctiveness, but optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer and Silver 2000) adds that people experience both a need for inclusion by and differentiation from others. Inclusion needs are met through membership of clearly discernible social groups with high in-group homogeneity and explicit criteria of inclusion and exclusion. Differentiation needs are satisfied by emphasizing differences between one's in-group and out-groups and by establishing clear group boundaries.

When considering the nature of citizenship criteria that belong to ethnic and cultural citizenship representations, it becomes clear that they are particularly conducive to the satisfaction of both inclusion and differentiation needs. A common ancestry or culture as a basis for citizenship creates a clearly discernible and strongly homogeneous national in-group, which has explicit criteria of inclusion and exclusion, has clear group boundaries, and is strongly differentiated from out-groups. Hence, it is likely that national majority group members with relatively strong inclusion and differentiation needs would endorse an ethnic or cultural citizenship representation. Because these majority group members prefer the national in-group to be ethnically or culturally homogeneous and clearly distinct from out-groups, they are likely to perceive immigrants as threatening and oppose immigration (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Citrin and Sides 2008). Accordingly, we predict that stronger endorsement of ethnic and cultural citizenship representations goes together

with a preference for more restrictive migration policies (i.e. more restrictions on immigration and the granting of citizenship and less facilitation of integration).

Several studies have shown that, nowadays, culture is a more important determinant of inter-group relations and anti-immigrant attitudes than race (e.g. Bail 2008; Citrin and Sides 2008; Ariely 2011b; Reijerse et al. 2013). As a possible explanation, Reijerse et al. (2013) pointed to the historical shift from blatant to symbolic racism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). Blatant racism, which focuses on ethnicity and/or race, has become socially unacceptable, while symbolic racism, which focuses on protecting culture and maintaining cultural dominance, has become more prevalent. Another factor in the decline of ethnicity and race as determinants of inter-group relations may be globalization. Ariely (2012b), for example, found that people in countries with higher globalization levels were less likely to endorse ethnic citizenship representations. Many of the most globalized countries in Ariely's sample were EU countries. In accordance with these studies, we predict that the cultural citizenship representation will show more robust relationships with policy preferences than the ethnic representation.

In contrast, people who endorse a civic citizenship representation seem to be less concerned with in-group homogeneity and distinctiveness and thus appear to have weaker inclusion and differentiation needs. To be accepted as citizens, immigrants only need to respect basic civic principles; their ethnic and cultural background is irrelevant. The national in-group created by applying civic citizenship criteria resembles a superordinate identity as described in the common in-group identity model (CIIM) or the mutual inter-group differentiation model (MIDM; Gaertner et al. 1994; Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Hornsey and Hogg 2000). Majority group members and immigrants are re-categorized into a superordinate national group, and all are free to retain their ethnic and cultural subgroup identities. Because majority group members with a civic representation allow the national in-group to be ethnically and culturally diverse, they do not perceive immigrants as threatening. Accordingly, we predict that stronger endorsement of a civic representation goes along with a preference for more inclusive migration policies (i.e. less restriction on immigration and the granting of citizenship and more facilitation of integration).

## **Method**

### ***Participants***

The present study analysed survey data from Reijerse et al. (2013), but because these data only included countries from the western, northern and eastern parts of the EU, additional data were collected in Italy (a southern European country) in order to geographically represent the whole EU. Selected countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden – varied considerably with respect to migration policies and public attitudes towards immigrants. They represented four clusters of countries, which were identified by Reeskens (2009) and are ranked here from most to least open towards immigrants: Scandinavian, North-Western European, Southern European and Central/Eastern European. France represents a special case, because in Reeskens' research it did not fit into any of these

Table 1. Statistics on participants by country.

| Country         | <i>N</i> | Male (%) | <i>M</i> <sub>Age</sub> | <i>SD</i> <sub>Age</sub> |
|-----------------|----------|----------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Belgium         | 236      | 44.1     | 17.38                   | 0.67                     |
| France          | 186      | 39.8     | 17.74                   | 1.30                     |
| Germany         | 207      | 47.8     | 17.61                   | 0.94                     |
| Hungary         | 272      | 36.8     | 16.87                   | 1.24                     |
| Italy           | 258      | 42.6     | 17.34                   | 0.75                     |
| The Netherlands | 305      | 46.9     | 16.58                   | 0.83                     |
| Sweden          | 270      | 38.1     | 17.18                   | 0.63                     |

clusters. In Belgium, data were only collected in Flanders (i.e. the Dutch-speaking region). To facilitate cross-national comparisons, majority group high-school students in academic tracks ( $N = 1,734$ ) were selected as participants. Participating schools were located in medium- to large-sized cities with substantial immigrant populations. Descriptive information about participants is presented by country in Table 1. Average age and gender distribution were comparable across samples. In addition, parents' education (a proxy for socio-economic status) was also similar across samples. The average level of parental education was vocational or higher vocational schooling. The survey was conducted in the classroom with a researcher present. Participants received questionnaires in their native language, which were created through translation and back-translation (Reijerse et al. 2013).

### Measures

All items were measured on seven-point Likert scales (e.g. 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). To measure citizenship representations, we used the empirically established ethnic, cultural and civic scales from Reijerse et al. (2013). These researchers proved these scales to be partially metrically invariant across all countries considered in our study, except Italy (which we added to their data set). This level of measurement equivalence allows for direct cross-national comparisons of relationships between latent variables (Meuleman and Billiet 2006). The ethnic scale had three items, the cultural six, and the civic scale five. For example, while inquiring about characteristics that are considered to be important in accepting someone as a citizen, participants were asked: To what extent do you consider it important that... 'that person has [e.g. Belgian] ancestors?' (ethnic); 'a [e.g. German] person passes on the [e.g. German] culture to the next generations?' (cultural); and 'a [e.g. Dutch] person accepts that members of all cultural groups may participate in the political process, where societal rules are developed?' (civic). Higher scores indicated stronger endorsement of a representation.

Migration policy preferences were measured with nine self-constructed items. They inquired about preferences regarding immigration policy (i.e. restrictiveness of entrance policies), citizenship policy (i.e. restrictiveness in granting immigrants citizenship) and integration policy (i.e. governmental facilitation of immigrants' integration). Initially, the items were expected to load onto a single latent factor and



were coded so that higher scores indicated a preference for more restrictive policies (i.e. more restrictions on immigration and granting of citizenship and less facilitation of integration). However, analysis revealed that the items loaded onto two separate factors. The measure was split and some items were recoded (see Results section and [Appendix 1](#), which contains all items and the eventual scales).

### **Analysis**

First, multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) was used to assess the cross-national measurement equivalence of the total measurement model. The differential comparative fit index ( $\Delta$ CFI; Cheung and Rensvold 2002) was used to assess metric invariance (i.e. invariant factor loadings) because, in contrast to the more common chi-squared test,  $\Delta$ CFI is not sensitive to sample size. Invariance is supported when  $\Delta$ CFI  $\leq$  0.01 and model fit remains acceptable (see the end of this section). Second, a multiple group structural equation model (MGSEM) was tested, in which the three citizenship representations simultaneously predicted migration policy preferences. This enabled us to investigate which representations were most robustly related to the policy preferences. Under the assumption of multivariate normality, maximum likelihood estimation was used for all MGCFA and MGSEM models. Models were fitted with Mplus 6 (Muthén and Muthén 2010) and included only continuous latent variables. Model fit was considered good when the CFI  $\geq$  0.90, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)  $\leq$  0.06 and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR)  $\leq$  0.08 (Marsh, Hau, and Wen 2004).

## **Results**

### **MGCFA**

Besides the variables of interest, a latent variable was added to the total measurement model to control for acquiescence effects on the policy preferences scale caused by the inclusion of reverse-coded items (Billiet and McClendon 2000). The initial unconstrained measurement model did not have a good fit ( $\chi^2(1,540, 1,734) = 3,007.589, p < .001, CFI = 0.906, RMSEA = 0.062, SRMR = 0.068$ ). An inspection of the model revealed that in each country the integration policy indicators of the policy preferences latent variable had weak factor loadings. A model in which the policy preferences latent variable was split into a separate ‘restrictions on immigration’ (and citizenship) latent variable and a ‘facilitation of integration’ latent variable (see [Appendix 1](#)) had a much better fit ( $\Delta$ CFI = 0.030).<sup>1</sup> In this model, the facilitation of integration indicators were recoded so that higher scores meant a preference for more facilitation. The fully metric invariant version of this adapted model had a slightly worse fit than its unconstrained counterpart ( $\Delta$ CFI = 0.014). A test of partial metric invariance (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998) yielded a model in which only five loadings (i.e. one for both a cultural and civic indicator in Hungary, one for a civic indicator in Italy, and one for a facilitation of integration indicator in both the Netherlands and Sweden) had to be released to achieve good fit ( $\chi^2(1,608, 1,734) = 2,736.265, p < .001, CFI = 0.928, RMSEA = 0.053, SRMR = 0.077$ ). This fit was not worse than that of the unconstrained model ( $\Delta$ CFI = 0.008), so the final measurement

model exhibited partial metric invariance (with the degree of variance being rather small). This degree of measurement equivalence allows for direct cross-national comparisons of relationships between latent variables, but not for comparisons of mean scores (Meuleman and Billiet 2006). Variance inflation factors (VIFs) did not reveal multicollinearity among our variables. The largest VIF was 2.38 and VIFs should stay below 10 (Myers 1990). Means, standard deviations and latent inter-factor correlations are presented by country in Table 2.

### ***MGSEM***

We tested a model in which the citizenship representations simultaneously predicted the policy preferences. We imposed metric invariance on the measurement part of the model, but loadings that were released in the total measurement model were freely estimated. Structural relations between citizenship representations and policy preferences were set equally across countries to test their invariance. The model's fit was good ( $\chi^2(1,651, 1,734) = 2,807.404, p < .001, CFI = 0.926, RMSEA = 0.053, SRMR = 0.080$ ) and not worse than that of the unconstrained model ( $\Delta CFI = 0.009$ ). In spite of significant latent inter-factor correlations between the ethnic representation and the policy preferences (see Table 2), the structural paths from the ethnic representation to both policy preferences were non-significant in this simultaneous analysis. The path from the cultural representation to the facilitation of integration preference was also noticeably weak ( $\beta = -0.11, p < .001$ ). In our final model (see Figure 1) we set these three paths equal to zero across countries. This model fitted the data well ( $\chi^2(1,654, 1,734) = 2,825.420, p < .001, CFI = 0.925, RMSEA = 0.053, SRMR = 0.080$ ) and not worse than the unconstrained model ( $\Delta CFI = 0.010$ ). That the path from the cultural representation to the facilitation of integration preference could also be set equal to zero without loss of model fit, indicates that the weak but significant effect in the initial model is not a substantial effect after all. As expected, the cultural representation related positively and the civic representation negatively to a preference for restrictions on immigration (and the granting of citizenship). The civic representation also related positively to a preference for facilitation of integration. The model explained a noticeably large amount of variance in the policy preferences (see Figure 1).

### **Discussion**

Although citizenship representations are traditionally deduced from state policies on migration, no studies have investigated whether individual differences in citizenship representations are reliably associated with individual differences in migration policy preferences. This study examined the relationships of ethnic, cultural and civic citizenship representations with migration policy preferences among majority group high-school students in academic tracks in seven EU countries. According to claims in the literature, a cultural representation implies openness towards immigrants (Nielsen 1999; Kymlicka 2001). However, latent inter-factor correlations showed that, generally, both ethnic and cultural representations were associated with preferences for more restrictions on immigration (and the granting of citizenship) and less facilitation of



Table 2. Means, standard deviations and latent inter-factor correlations by country.

|                                | <i>M</i>                       | <i>SD</i> | 1.       | 2.       | 3.       | 4.       |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <i>Belgium</i>                 |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 3.06 <sub>c1</sub>             | 1.50      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 4.54 <sub>a3</sub>             | 0.88      | 0.33***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 4.83 <sub>b4</sub>             | 0.93      | –0.56*** | 0.11     | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 4.63 <sub>c3</sub>             | 0.88      | 0.35***  | 0.39***  | –0.45*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.21 <sub>ab2</sub>            | 0.93      | –0.41*** | –0.12    | 0.74***  | –0.67*** |
| <i>France</i>                  |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 2.39 <sub>a1</sub>             | 1.36      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 4.63 <sub>a3</sub>             | 1.02      | 0.36***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 5.50 <sub>d<sub>e</sub>4</sub> | 0.90      | –0.46*** | 0.14     | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 4.00 <sub>a2</sub>             | 1.02      | 0.42***  | 0.61***  | –0.30*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.67 <sub>c3</sub>             | 1.08      | –0.30*** | –0.29**  | 0.47***  | –0.81*** |
| <i>Germany</i>                 |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 2.39 <sub>a1</sub>             | 1.33      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 4.45 <sub>a3</sub>             | 1.07      | 0.40***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 5.51 <sub>e5</sub>             | 1.01      | –0.62*** | –0.30*** | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 4.36 <sub>b2</sub>             | 1.12      | 0.50***  | 0.59***  | –0.63*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.84 <sub>e4</sub>             | 0.96      | –0.43*** | –0.34*** | 0.78***  | –0.60*** |
| <i>Hungary</i>                 |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 3.84 <sub>d1</sub>             | 1.58      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 5.23 <sub>b5</sub>             | 1.07      | 0.35***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 4.55 <sub>a3</sub>             | 1.02      | –0.29*** | –0.11    | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 4.85 <sub>d4</sub>             | 1.01      | 0.26***  | 0.18*    | –0.47*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.12 <sub>a2</sub>             | 1.08      | –0.11    | –0.04    | 0.76***  | –0.61*** |
| <i>Italy</i>                   |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 3.85 <sub>d1</sub>             | 1.73      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 5.51 <sub>c4</sub>             | 0.91      | 0.41***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 5.00 <sub>b3</sub>             | 1.39      | –0.44*** | –0.17*   | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 5.17 <sub>e3</sub>             | 1.18      | 0.51***  | 0.46***  | –0.69*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.22 <sub>ab2</sub>            | 1.36      | –0.49*** | –0.35*** | 0.83***  | –0.81*** |
| <i>The Netherlands</i>         |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 2.61 <sub>ab1</sub>            | 1.44      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 4.50 <sub>a3</sub>             | 1.00      | 0.53***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 5.20 <sub>c4</sub>             | 0.94      | –0.61*** | –0.30*** | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 4.56 <sub>c3</sub>             | 0.98      | 0.54***  | 0.61***  | –0.65*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.29 <sub>b2</sub>             | 0.88      | –0.35*** | –0.25*** | 0.73***  | –0.76*** |
| <i>Sweden</i>                  |                                |           |          |          |          |          |
| 1. Representation: ethnic      | 2.69 <sub>b1</sub>             | 1.80      | –        |          |          |          |
| 2. Representation: cultural    | 4.55 <sub>a3</sub>             | 1.27      | 0.49***  | –        |          |          |
| 3. Representation: civic       | 5.30 <sub>cd5</sub>            | 1.18      | –0.57*** | –0.21**  | –        |          |
| 4. Restrictions on immigration | 4.13 <sub>a2</sub>             | 1.22      | 0.55***  | 0.54***  | –0.62*** | –        |
| 5. Facilitation of integration | 4.79 <sub>c4</sub>             | 1.09      | –0.37*** | –0.06    | 0.64***  | –0.50*** |

Note: Letters following means indicate whether mean differences between countries (on the same variable) are significant. Means without letters in common differ significantly from each other (lowest mean score starts with 'a', etc.). Numbers following means indicate whether mean differences within one country (between the different variables) are significant. Means with different numbers differ significantly from each other (lowest mean score starts with '1', etc.).

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ .




Figure 1. Multiple group structural equation model with ethnic, cultural and civic citizenship representations predicting preferences for restrictions on immigration and facilitation of integration.

Note: Factor loadings and structural relations between independent and dependent variables are invariant across countries. Structural paths from the ethnic citizenship representation to both policy preferences and from the cultural representation to facilitation of integration are set equal to zero across countries. Correlations between latent variables are standardized (ranges given on curved double-headed arrows), but path coefficients are unstandardized estimates.  $R^2$  = explained variance, \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

integration. The civic representation was associated with preferences for less restrictions and more facilitation, respectively.

When the citizenship representations were analysed simultaneously, using MGSEM, the ethnic representation was no longer significantly associated with policy preferences. This suggests that the ethnic representation mainly relates to policy preferences because of its relationship to the cultural and civic representations. Initially, a weakly significant relationship between the cultural representation and the facilitation of integration preference was found, but our final model showed that it was not substantial. Therefore, our prediction that the cultural representation would show more robust relationships with the policy preferences than the ethnic representation is only supported for the restrictions on immigration preference. As discussed earlier, this finding could be explained by the historical shift from blatant to symbolic racism (Reijerse et al. 2013) and the relatively high levels of globalization in EU countries, which lowers the endorsement of ethnic representations (Ariely 2012b). Perhaps significant effects of an ethnic representation might be found in other parts of the world that have lower globalization and immigration levels. This should be further

investigated. What is relevant to mention here is that in the present study, Hungary (i.e. a recent EU member with a low immigration level) and Italy (i.e. a recent immigration country) had the highest mean scores on the ethnic representation (see Table 2).

The civic representation was important in explaining the facilitation of integration preference (see Figure 1), possibly because it stresses equal rights for immigrants and encourages participation in society, both of which can be promoted through integration. Perhaps the cultural representation did not explain any additional variance because people who endorse it may be ambivalent towards integration. They may perceive immigrants as threatening national in-group homogeneity and prefer them to assimilate rather than integrate. However, although integration alone is not enough, they may nonetheless regard it as an inherent aspect of assimilation.

If our findings can be generalized to national populations, the observed relationships could have implications for the implementation of migration policies. For example, in previous studies, ethnic and cultural citizenship representations were associated with anti-immigrant attitudes (Meeus et al. 2010; Reijerse et al. 2013). Although anti-immigrant attitudes may, in part, be caused by a perception that immigrants are insufficiently integrated, those who endorse ethnic or cultural representations seem to prefer less rather than more facilitation of integration. So, rather than perceiving a lack of integration, they simply may not want immigrants to integrate. After all, the cultural representation goes together with preferences for cultural homogeneity and assimilation and the ethnic representation implies marginalization of immigrants (Shulman 2002). However, we cannot rule out that people endorsing ethnic or cultural representations want immigrants to integrate on their own, without governmental facilitation. In line with this, a study in Belgium suggests that a large part of the host population considers cultural adaptation a responsibility of immigrants themselves (Van Acker et al. forthcoming). Whether those who endorse ethnic or cultural representations want immigrants to integrate or not, a government trying to improve perceptions of immigrants by facilitating integration is unlikely to succeed. If anything, it may increase the already negative attitudes of people with ethnic or cultural representations, not only because they disapprove of such policies, but also because facilitation may reinforce stereotypes of immigrants as depending on government support.

Results regarding the civic citizenship representation also provide a valuable new insight. They suggest that it may be associated with encouraging immigration and providing support to immigrants. This goes far beyond associations with the positive attitudes and reduced prejudice found in previous studies. The content of our policy preference measures (see Appendix 1) suggests that people who strongly endorse a civic representation support increased immigration, want to make citizenship more attainable for immigrants, and support their government facilitating integration. They may even support positive discrimination (see Appendix 1, integration item no. 4). This is not self-evident. Although people who endorse a civic representation are open to immigrants entering their country, integrating and obtaining citizenship, there is no theoretical reason why they would actually encourage immigration or be in favour of lending additional support to immigrants upon arrival. Participation in society is part of a civic representation, but this could also be regarded a personal responsibility rather

than something to be facilitated. Hence, our findings add to the understanding of the civic citizenship representation.

### *Limitations and suggestions*

An important limitation of the present study is the cross-sectional nature of the data, which prohibits conclusions about causality. Although policy preferences may depend on one's citizenship representation, policy preferences might also determine which representation is adopted. Hence, research addressing causality is required. In addition, although sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds already hold political attitudes (Amadeo et al. 2002) and some studies found no significant differences in migration attitudes between adolescent and adult samples (Hofstra, Van Oudenhoven, and Van der Zee forthcoming), caution is advised in generalizing our results to national populations. Research indicates that older people tend to endorse ethnic representations more strongly (Pakulski and Tranter 2000) and, therefore, might favour more restrictive migration policies. Studies with representative samples are advised. Another limitation is that our policy preference measure did not inquire about actual policies. The measure indicates whether policies should become more restrictive or less, but participants were not explicitly asked to take current national policies as a reference point. This would be difficult, because many people are unaware of their country's policies. Despite this, our measure offers a valuable indication of inclinations towards migration policies.

One way to build on the present study would be to include more countries and conduct a simultaneous multilevel analysis of the relationships between national migration policies, people's policy preferences and their citizenship representations. Because little is known about the origin of people's citizenship representations and because these representations are reciprocally related to other politically relevant variables (e.g. national identification; Duriez et al. 2013), research might also focus on the determinants of citizenship representations. It seems plausible that the development of citizenship representations is tied to social categorization. After all, in order for people to categorize themselves and others into social groups, they must first select membership criteria. Perhaps citizenship representations depend on some of the same factors that influence social categorization, like inclusion and differentiation needs (Brewer and Silver 2000). Individual difference variables like right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al. 1994) may also affect social categorization and co-determine citizenship representations. For example, people high on SDO are probably motivated to preserve in-group homogeneity and distinctiveness; out-group members are seen as inferior and should not join the nation. Accordingly, they may adopt ethnic or cultural citizenship representations to promote ethnic or cultural homogeneity.

Citizenship research should also focus on the immigrant perspective, instead of predominantly on the majority perspective. Some studies have already considered the impact of citizenship conceptualizations on immigrants. Wright and Bloemraad (2012), for instance, found that more inclusive citizenship policies may contribute to immigrants' sense of sociopolitical integration.

Finally, an important question in citizenship research concerns the role of citizenship representations in the relationship between national identification and reactions towards

immigrants. Studies have found both moderation and mediation effects of citizenship representations (Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka 2009; Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown 2009; Meeus et al. 2010). We argued that people with strong inclusion and differentiation needs may favour ethnic or cultural representations, because ethnic and cultural citizenship criteria result in distinct and homogeneous national in-groups that satisfy these needs. According to Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002), people who identify strongly with their in-group are motivated to preserve its homogeneity and distinctiveness. In addition, strong in-group identification is engendered by groups that satisfy both inclusion and differentiation needs (Brewer and Silver 2000). We also argued that people with weaker inclusion and differentiation needs may favour a civic representation, which implies re-categorization of majority group members and immigrants into a superordinate national group. According to Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (2002), those who identify weakly with their in-group tend to favour superordinate re-categorization. Taken together, these studies suggest that strong national identification goes together with strong inclusion and differentiation needs and preserving in-group homogeneity and distinctiveness, while weak identification goes together with a preference for superordinate re-categorization. This, in turn, suggests that national identification relates positively to ethnic and cultural citizenship representations and negatively to the civic representation. This is in line with a mediation rather than a moderation model. However, in Ariely (2012a) the individual-level relationship between national identification and reactions towards immigrants was moderated by state-level citizenship representations. Countries with more inclusive citizenship policies showed a weaker positive relationship between national identification and xenophobia. In countries with full *ius soli* policies, where citizenship is granted on the basis of being born within the national territory, this relationship was negative. It would be interesting to examine further the moderation versus mediation question using multilevel analysis.

## Conclusion

This study demonstrated that citizenship representations are reliably associated with migration policy preferences among majority group high-school students from seven EU countries. Despite important differences between national contexts (e.g. in migration histories, policy regimes and ethnic relations), the relationships between citizenship representations and policy preferences were cross-nationally invariant. Results suggest that the ethnic representation is becoming less relevant in determining people's reactions towards immigrants, which could be interpreted as a step towards more harmonious inter-group relations. However, the cultural representation was associated with a preference for restrictions on immigration and the granting of citizenship. If these results can be generalized to national populations, it appears that, nowadays, immigrants are excluded on the basis of culture rather than ethnicity. The good news is that, in line with other recent studies (e.g. Meeus et al. 2010; Wright 2011), most countries in our sample had their highest mean score on the civic representation, which was associated with a preference for more inclusive migration policies.

To foster social cohesion in increasingly ethnically and culturally diverse societies, politicians, other state actors and socialization agents might try to promote a civic citizenship representation. Some political theorists may be concerned that a civic conceptualization of the nation might be too weak to foster enough solidarity and commitment. Although ethnicity and/or culture may foster stronger attachments to the nation, it has not been proven that such thick attachments are essential for liberal democracies to function (Hjerm and Schnabel 2010). Given that ethnic and cultural diversity are increasing in EU countries, national attachments based on ethnicity and/or culture are more likely to be dysfunctional instead. The best available option appears to be a more civic-based solidarity, which may yet need to be further specified and developed.

Although it may not be a reliable practice to deduce citizenship representations from state policies on migration, our individual-level study of the relationships between citizenship representations and migration policy preferences offers valuable new insights that validate the call for more public opinion studies on citizenship.

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### Note

1. An additional exploratory factor analysis on the policy preferences measure revealed that the immigration and citizenship policy indicators loaded on one factor and the integration policy indicators on a second factor. Analysis is available from the first author upon request.

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## **Appendix 1. Migration policy preference measures**

### ***Restrictions on immigration***

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about migration issues?

- (1) Overall, our country's immigration policy is too open.
- (2) Generally, it is too easy for immigrants to attain full citizenship in our country.
- (3) Our government should set strict rules and conditions, which must be met, before immigrants can attain full citizenship.
- (4) I would prefer migration to our country to be...

(1 = decreased a lot, 7 = increased a lot; reverse-coded)

- (5) I would support an immigration policy that allows in... immigrants.

(1 = very few, 7 = very many; reverse-coded)

### ***Facilitation of integration***

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about migration issues?

- (1) Our government should make more of an effort at integrating immigrants into our society.
- (2) I think immigrants should be offered a naturalization programme, but only on a voluntary basis.
- (3) I think our government should actively protect immigrants against discrimination.
- (4) Our government should start up programmes, specifically for immigrants, which help them to increase their chances of getting a job.

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